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Abstract—Cooperation of research groups is nowadays com-
mon for the development and execution of biomedical analyses.
Multiple partners contribute data in this context, data that
is often centralized for processing at some cluster-based or
supercomputer-based infrastructure. In contrast, real distributed
collaboration that involves processing of data from several
partners at different sites is rare. However, such distributed
analyses are often very interesting, in particular, for scalability,
security and privacy reasons.
In this article, we motivate the need for real distributed
biomedical analyses in the context of several ongoing projects,
including the I-CAN project that involves 34 French hospitals and
affiliated research groups. We present a set of distributed archi-
tectures for such analyses that we have derived from discussions
with different medical research groups and a study of related
work. These architectures allow for scalability, security/privacy
and reproducibility issues to be taken into account. Finally, we
illustrate that these architectures can serve as the basis of a
development method for biomedical distributed analyses.
Index Terms—bioinformatics, distributed systems, repro-
ducibility, scalability, security, privacy, workflow
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of biomedical analyses, in particular genetic
ones, abounds with scenarios involving the cooperation of
multiple, often numerous, different stakeholders. The analyses
are typically characterized by the application of new analysis
algorithms to (very) large volumes of data. Distributed collab-
orations and the distributed execution of analyses should be a
method of choice in this context, for instance, because some
data may have to be remotely processed but other data — such
as identifying clinical, imaging or genetic data — may have
to be processed locally, for instance, due to legal or security
reasons.
Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS) are statistical
analyses that require interrogating hundreds of thousands of
genetic markers among large groups of human subjects, in
order to identify genetic variants (or haplotypes) associated
to particular phenotypes or diseases. Such large-scale ap-
proaches, which commonly requires international collabora-
tions involving multiple research groups, have contributed to
the elucidation of the genetic architecture of common diseases
such as type-2 diabetes or Alzheimer’s disease. [1]–[4]. These
analyses usually consist in statistically comparing the minor
allele frequencies of genetic variants across the whole genome,
between two groups of affected versus unaffected individuals
(case-control studies). The statistical significance of the dis-
covered associations is often limited by the number of cases
or control individuals included in the GWAS, especially in
the context of less common diseases. It then becomes critical
to join parallel efforts internationally and combine multiple
case-control datasets into large-scale meta-analyses. However,
joining genotype datasets in such meta-analyses raises several
legal and ethical issues since individual genetic profiles are
highly identifying : sharing case-control genotype datasets
must be carefully controlled to conform with national data
protection laws (implementations of the EU General Data
Protection Regulation). In addition, once transferred, control-
ling how data is used by collaborating partner is particularly
challenging : (1) there is no easy means to assess that genotype
data are only used in the context of the original collaborative
study, and (2) effective data removal is declarative and only
based on mutual trust between partners. Modern distributed
computing infrastructures should thus provide means to limit
data transfer/centralization and enable data providers to keep
full control on their own data, while allowing for large scale
meta-analyses on individual genotype profiles.
Most medical research projects mainly harness distribution
currently as a means to speed up computations through the
use of cluster-like infrastructures. Computations are therefore
mostly performed at a single site, so they do not involve or
involve only little distributed collaboration. For example, often
MapReduce is used to improve the performance of biomedical
analyses, without distributed collaboration among different
sites [5]–[8].
This is also the case for the current configuration of the
I-CAN project1, in which 34 French hospitals contribute their
data to centralized servers for storage first. Data processing,
which includes clinical, imaging and genetic data, is then
performed on a different server but also in a centralized
fashion, which implies large-scale data transmission at the
moment of computation that requires a high-speed network
to be available.
However, distributed collaborations become mandatory be-
cause of the following requirements:
• Flexible placement of computations and data in the con-
text of locality constraints. Some data may have to be kept
at a site where only a part of an analysis is performed.
• Security and privacy constraints on data usage and anal-
ysis execution may require that data from different sites
cannot be pooled at one site.
1http://www.agence-nationale-recherche.fr/Project-ANR-15-CE17-0008
• Scalability for performance reasons may depend on parts
of the analysis be performed at different sites.
These three requirements constitute, at the same time, difficult
challenges in a distributed environment. In addition to these
requirements, reproducibility is another important challenge
in the context of distributed medical analyses. The I-CAN
members, for example, envision three evolutions involving
distributed collaboration because of these requirements.
Moreover, the structure of distributed collaborations for
biomedical analyses strongly depends on architectural ele-
ments, such as the use of private, community or public clouds
with high-speed network access, the availability of trusted
parties and servers as well as whether input data must be
hidden or not from the other stakeholders in the collaboration.
As to our knowledge, no systematic analysis of collaboration
architectures has been presented until now.
Based on our cooperation in multiple bioinformatics
projects as well as a study of related work, we have performed
a first systematic analysis of architectures for distributed
biomedical analyses. The main goal of this paper is to fuel
discussion on distributed biomedical collaborations based on
three contributions:
• We motivate the use of distributed biomedical coopera-
tion and discuss corresponding issues in the context of
a real-world multi-center biomedical study, I-CAN that
involves 34 French hospitals.
• We introduce a set of architectures for distributed
biomedical analyses that are motivated by corresponding
scenarios from real-world biomedical projects.
• We present a preliminary version of a method for the
design and implementation of distributed biomedical
analyses that meets the requirements introduced above.
We apply the resulting approach to the I-CAN project and
show how it could benefit from the proposed distributed
cloud-based architectures.
This paper is structured as follows. We motivate distributed
collaborations for biomedical analyses based on the I-CAN
project in Sec. II. Sec. III presents distributed collaboration
architectures. Our approach to the definition of distributed
biomedical analyses and its application to the I-CAN project is
presented in Sec. IV. We then discuss related work in Sec. V
and conclude.
II. THE I-CAN BIOMEDICAL STUDY
We now present a real-world biomedical study, the I-
CAN project, which involves collaboration among 34 French
hospitals and research groups. I-CAN is a multi-center study
aimed at bridging clinical observations, genomic markers as
well as quantitative imaging biomarkers to better understand
the formation, the development and the possible rupture of
intracranial aneurysms. Fig. 1 shows the currently deployed
architecture that leverages multiple infrastructures.
In this project, each participating university hospital is popu-
lating data repositories provided by domain-specific infrastruc-
tures. Time-Of-Flight MRIs and arteriographies are centralized
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Fig. 1. Leveraging heterogeneous data repositories when studying intracranial
aneurysms development and rupture cases
in a medical imaging repository, clinical observations are
centrally hosted by the university hospital coordinating the
clinical study through its clinical research database, and omics
data is centrally hosted elsewhere by the genetics research lab
responsible for the sequencing of biological samples and the
required bioinformatics analyses.
In this architecture, compute-intensive analyses are per-
formed at the genetics and bioinformatics lab, which operates
a cluster originally dedicated to bioinformatics applications.
This approach is pragmatic since no computing infrastructure
is available close to the partners that principally generate
medical imaging data. However it presents several drawbacks.
First, medical imaging data must be transferred between two
sites, which often represent a waste of time, energy and raises
security risks. Moreover, the bioinformatics cluster must be
tooled with the required image processing software compo-
nents so that the MRI quantification workflow can be run and
parallelized. However, the image processing software is rarely
of use at that cluster.
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Fig. 2. Distributed computing strategies can provide means to tackle security,
scalability as well as reproducibility challenges in large-scale biomedical
studies.
The I-CAN partners currently discuss different extension
scenarios. For instance, we show in Fig. 2 that genetic
data sequenced at the Genetics & bioinformatics lab. can
be contributed to an international cohort in the context of
an international collaborative analysis. In this paper, we pro-
pose corresponding distributed architectures that address the
distributed analysis challenges mentioned in the introduction.
Concretely, three major challenges important to the project are
illustrated in Fig. 2:
• C1: Scalability. For a single individual, the combination
of novel imaging techniques as well as the availability
of genome-wide sequencing technologies require an un-
precedented amount of computation time. Centralizing
computations hardly cope with the size of the studied
cohorts: 3000 considered cases in the context of the ICAN
project.
• C2: Reproducibility. When joining international efforts
in the context of genome-wide association studies for
instance, data coming from each partner are pooled to
increase findings statistical power. This requires to be sure
that the very same data analysis workflow is reproduced
on each participating dataset.
• C3: Security & Privacy The privacy of individuals who
contribute their genetic markers for research should be
protected not only by hiding their identity, but also — and
especially — by not divulging any information about their
genomes. In the context of GWAS, even aggregate data
from each country cannot be shared because of possible
identifying attacks [9]. Therefore, GWA studies require
ad-hoc security protocols and architectures to be applied
at this level i.e., privacy-preserving GWAS as in [10].
III. DISTRIBUTED COLLABORATION FOR BIOMEDICAL
ANALYSES
Collaboration between multiple clinical and research groups
is common and there is a growing need for the coordination
of distributed analyses that are executed at different sites. The
notion of architecture is central to the design and implemen-
tation of such distributed collaborative analyses that have to
meet the challenges introduced before. However, currently no
systematic study of architectures for distributed biomedical
analyses has been performed. In this section we first review
common architectural elements that have been used in this
context. We then present the main contribution of this paper,
a series of architectures that we have extracted from our review
of related work and discussions with different research groups
and projects from the medical domain.
A. Current architectural elements for biomedical analyses
Three architectural elements are principally used in current
biomedical analyses: cloud infrastructures, trusted parties and
hybrid architectures.
1) Cloud infrastructures: Cloud infrastructures, notably
private clouds hosted, for example, by a research organization,
are already commonly used in biomedical research. Public
clouds are often suited for analyses involving massive vol-
umes of data but are more rarely used, principally because
of security and privacy issues. Public clouds use is widely
advocated, however, by computer science research community
where such constraints are already resolved, such as GWAS
analyses that can operate on encrypted genetic data. In such
cases, the security and privacy properties of the corresponding
data sets are well known and the analyses can be conceived in
a such way that keeps data protected from other participants
and other intruders.
2) Trusted parties: Trusted parties that protect data and
computations all the while providing efficient infrastructures
for collaborative analyses is a common deployment model.
Data in such architectures has to be protected only during its
transfer to and from the processing trusted party using secure
communication protocols.
3) Hybrid infrastructures: Because biomedical data are
heterogeneous and its sensitivity to privacy issues differs
from one data set to another, one can consider a hybrid
infrastructure that mix public and private infrastructures for
analyses in order to process data in the most fitting envi-
ronment. Non-identifying data like de-identified neuroimages
can be analyzed on public clouds while genomes should be
analyzed in an isolated secure platform, e.g., locally. Another
scenario motivating the use of hybrid architectures is when
encrypted data has to be decrypted for processing at a secure
infrastructure and/or trusted party.
B. Architectures for distributed biomedical analyses
We now motivate and present a series of architectures
for collaborations involving distributed analyses. They are
characterized in terms of the requirements introduced before:
placement of computations and data, security/privacy consid-
erations, as well as scalability/performance. Additionally, our
analysis of related work and discussions with medical re-
searchers have resulted in a set of major architectural elements
(the first of which coincide with those commonly used and
discussed in the previous subsection):
• The use of public/community clouds and the involvement
of trusted parties.
• The availability of local computation and storage re-
sources.
• Whether data can be moved to a remote site or has to be
processed locally (e.g., because of legal/security reasons,
the volume of data involved or clinical data that has to
be generated locally).
• Whether the researcher performing the analysis is part
of the stakeholders owning the data and computation
facilities or whether he is external.
• Whether the involved parties can be able to have access to
(part of) the data of the other stakeholders or whether data
should be hidden from all stakeholders and only results
be available.
Fig. 3 gives an overview of real world and state-of-the-art
architectures that cover different kinds of existing biomedical
analyses as well as some future analyses our partners are
planning. We classify architectures according to the locality
properties of data and computations and explain their char-
acteristics with respect to the scalability and privacy criteria.
We symbolize community clouds and public clouds with red
and blue colored clouds respectively. Storage is indicated with
a database icon while computations are represented with a
gear. Most of the architectures that include public clouds do
not have current scenarios in the biomedical field, namely
Fig. 3(e), Fig. 3(f) and Fig. 3(h). These architectures, however,
can be very interesting in handling biomedical workflows with
resource demanding computations on highly heterogeneous
data.
1) Local storage and computations: Using this architecture
hospitals can provide limited storage and data processing
resources that are used for local processing at each site.
Therefore, the architecture in Fig. 3(a) requires an intermediate
hospital between researchers and data contributors that orches-
trates queries to the system and guarantees transparency for
researchers. From the researcher’s point of view, this scenario
supposes that data can be fully processed remotely and that he
only can get the final results. Queries can be sent to hospitals
via the mediating server that is also part of the study. clearly,
this type of architecture does not afford good scalability and
correct computational reproducibility is not guaranteed.
2) Local storage and processing on community clouds:
Fig. 3(b) depicts an architecture where a community cloud is
harnessed to speed up computations. This architecture is used
for example by numerous projects leveraging the cluster infras-
tructure of the French Institute of Bioinformatics2. This model
offers better performance than on-site processing (Fig. 3(a)),
but data need to be transferred to processing clusters each time
as they are stored locally. In addition, community and private
clouds often support scalability only in a limited fashion.
No issues related to reproducibility should emerge with this
model because executing the same workflow on input data is
straightforward given that data is pooled to a single location
for processing, that is, no workflow replication is needed.
3) Local storage and public cloud based processing: Most
proposals of secure GWAS advocate the use of public cloud
computing following the architecture of Fig. 3(c) [11]–[14];
data is first encrypted locally by each data owner, then sent
to be processed in a public cloud. With the availability of
special (aka. homomorphic) encryption algorithms, the public
cloud can process the data in its encrypted form and yield
encrypted results to the researcher. This way of processing
and data transfer is very important when dealing with highly
privacy-sensitive data, like genetic one. Finally, the researcher
can decrypt the results. In this protocol, encryption of input
data should be locally performed on the fly which supposes
that hospitals (or other entities) are endowed with sufficient
computation resources.
4) Community cloud storage and processing: The architec-
tures in Fig. 3(d) and Fig. 3(i) illustrate the case where hospi-
tals are either deprived of sufficient resources and expertise in
which case they need to outsource a big amount of data along
with computations or willing to grant easy and permanent
data access to researchers. For researchers, it is easier to work
with already available data and perform computations on the
corresponding site. Otherwise, the architecture can hardly be
scalable given that an important number of hospitals pool their
2https://www.france-bioinformatique.fr/
data and computations into the same community cloud almost
whenever new data is gathered. The current I-CAN project
architecture runs in the model of Fig. 3(d) regarding genetic
data and of Fig. 3(i) for neuroimaging data.
5) Hybrid cloud system for data processing: There are
cases where data owners, hospitals for instance, would prefer
local storage for, among others, security reasons. However,
in order to benefit from good performance they would rather
consider using the cloud computing for data processing, in
which case a hybrid cloud infrastructure as shown in 3(e) can
be of use, This is useful to satisfy different policies on different
data types: in the I-CAN project, for instance, genetic data is
processed on a private/community cloud and non-identifying
imaging data can be analyzed on a public cloud.
6) Hybrid cloud system for data storage and processing:
Fig 3(f) is an integration of architectures d and e into one
system where data can be stored at a community cloud while
data processing can be held in both private and public clouds.
The novelty of this combined system is that it i) grants
straightforward data access to researchers, ii) enhances scal-
ability/performance of computations and iii) helps to enforce
security/privacy constraints by processing private parts of the
data in a relatively more secure server i.e., community cloud.
7) Public cloud storage, hybrid cloud system for data
processing: The architecture of Fig. 3(g) is that of the solution
proposed in [10] intended to secure collaborative analyses on
medical and genetic data. In this architecture, medical and
genetic data is secured and stored in a public cloud that can
additionally handle computations that do not threaten data
privacy; otherwise, there is a trusted party e.g., community
cloud which handles computations where e.g., data decryption
would be needed. Encryption is not the only technique used
to preserve security/privacy constraints, data splitting can also
be used in order to avoid sensitive associations and intensive
encryption, hence splitting permits to enhance the overall
system performance. Scalability and security are the criteria
that define the architecture, thus, they are assured by construc-
tion. However, considering a trusted party for e.g., processing
genomes in plaintext is unlikely to allow for an international
collaboration, for instance, in the context of GWAS because
of legal and political considerations. A similar architecture is
depicted in Fig. 3(h), the difference with Fig. 3(g), is that
public cloud here is used only for storage, which means that
data cannot be analyzed in the protected state, for instance,
when they are symmetrically encrypted. This architecture can
be interesting for scenarios where storage is very resource
demanding while computations on the stored data do not occur
very often.
We evaluate architectures of Fig. 3 with respect to i)
scalability/performance of storage and computations, ii) secu-
rity/privacy of medical and genetic data and iii) reproducibility.
The evaluation is reported in table I. We choose to evaluate
scalability/performance along with security/privacy with three
levels: low (-), medium (+) and high (++) which is an
attempt to covering all depicted architectures. Reproducibility
is evaluated with straightforward (+), not straightforward (−).
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researcher
...
(b) local data storage, data pro-
cessing takes place at community
cloud infrastructure
researcher
...
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Fig. 3. Some forms of distributed collaboration architectures in Bioinformatics
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTED ARCHITECTURES EVALUATION
scalability/performance security/privacy of data computational reproducibility
Architecture storage computations
(a) - - ++ −
(b) - + + +
(c) - + ++ +
(d) + + + +
(e) - ++ + +
(f) + ++ + +
(g) ++ + + +
(h) ++ + + +
(i) + + + +
We drop the following main conclusions from the table:
• Reproducibility is straightforward when data is pooled in
a single server for processing and when virtualization can
be integrated in the system, which is an asset of cloud
computing.
• Data privacy is relatively high when data and computa-
tions do not migrate to beyond the control scope of its
owner or when it is fully processed while encrypted
• Data privacy decreases when parts of the data are tem-
porarily outsourced to be processed in the clear domain
or when it is outsourced in plaintext for storage
• When the architecture is hybrid, computations perfor-
mance increases due to easy scalability which alleviates
eventual network exchanges slowdown.
IV. CONSTRUCTING DISTRIBUTED BIOMEDICAL ANALYSES
We now consider the problem of how to design and im-
plement distributed biomedical analyses that meet the require-
ments and challenges motivated before (placement, scalability,
security/privacy and reproducibility). The discussion before,
notably Table I, suggests that three of these challenges are
essentially linked to the choice of architecture from Fig. 3(a).
Most prominently, the data and computation placement strat-
egy as well as the approach to scalability directly depend on
the architecture. Reproducibility can be facilitated much by the
right choice of architecture. This leaves security and privacy
issues as the challenge that have to be tackled using means
less directly coupled to the choice of the architecture.
We therefore advocate the following development method:
1) Choose an architecture for the deployment and execution
of the analysis that determines the placement strategy of
data and computations depending on the requirements of
the collaboration between research groups and available
infrastructure (hospitals, clusters etc.)
2) Define strategies for scalability and reproducibility based
on the elements of the architecture.
3) Define a security and privacy strategy in terms of local
and remote data placement and computations as well as
privacy-enhancing techniques, such as encryption and
database fragmentation.
4) Implement the distributed analysis.
In the previous section we have mainly discussed the issues
related to the first two steps. We now concentrate on how
to handle the security/privacy issues. We then discuss the
challenges the outlined development method faces in practice.
Finally, we show how such a method can be harnessed for
different evolutions of the collaboration model of the I-CAN
study.
A. Security and privacy-preserving technologies
Some security and privacy-preserving technologies for se-
cure biomedical analyses are well known: symmetric and
asymmetric encryption as well as homomorphic encryption,
for example. However, other advanced security techniques,
for instance, secure execution environments (Intel’s SGX)
and constraint-based data fragmentation are not yet largely
known. Moreover, few mechanisms apart from encryption and
access control mechanisms have been integrated into current
biomedical systems. Furthermore, not all biomedical studies in
need of multiparty collaboration got sufficient attention from
security and cryptography research communities, as does the
widely-used GWAS infrastructure for instance.
In this part, we briefly introduce advanced security and pri-
vacy mechanisms that have, for most, not yet been integrated
into state-of-the-art secure distributed biomedical analyses.
1) Homomorphic encryption: With the ever increasing
emergence of cloud based services, there was a need in
developing algorithms that allow data processing on cloud-like
infrastructures while preserving data privacy. Homomorphic
encryption schemes have emerged as a solution to this chal-
lenge. Actually, Homomorphically encrypted data can be pro-
cessed without the need to decrypt it first, that is, no need for
a key. In addition, the resulting computations yield encrypted
results. Homomorphic encryption has already been applied to
biomedical analyses and to the GWAS in particular [12]–[14]
employing architectures equivalent to the one depicted in 3(c).
In fact, by using homomorphic encryption schemes, data
owners can contribute to medical research without divulging
anything about their data sets to researchers but the final
results.
Homomorphic encryption generally has a significant impact
on the efficiency of calculations. It is currently only reasonably
usable for simple algorithms that perform additions or mul-
tiplications only. Fully homomorphic encryption that allows
arbitrary computations to be performed over encrypted data is
still very inefficient [15].
2) Secure processing environments (SPE): Secure environ-
ments for clear data processing can be constructed based
on software support for trusted parties [10] or specialized
hardware support, such as Intel’s Software Guard Extension
(SGX), which provides a notion of secure enclaves. SPEs are
of particular interest if homomorphic encryption is not efficient
enough or, more generally, if processing encrypted data is not
applicable.
Recently, there is an increasing tendency in adopting secure
hardware component based computations for biomedical anal-
yses, in particular for the GWAS. The first was suggested by
Canim et al. [16]. Interestingly, the secure component can be
part of an untrusted server, for instance in a public cloud [17].
Actually, its characteristics of isolating critical computations
on sensitive data from privileged software, for instance the
OS, makes it a special case of trusted party based analyses.
Combinations of homomorphic encryption and SGX tech-
nology can be used, for example, when the encryption scheme
is partially homomorphic but the analysis requires operations
on data that cannot be performed in the encrypted domain.
For example, Fisher’s exact statistical test can be securely
processed inside an SGX enclave after contingency tables
of a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) from several
contributors were added to each other using Paillier’s additive
homomorphic cryptosystem at the untrusted server level [18].
3) Data fragmentation: Data fragmentation is quite com-
mon in real-life deployments of biomedical infrastructures. For
example, in I-CAN, data is fragmented and the fragments are
distributed to different poles of expertise. Doing so has other
virtues, indeed, fragmentation and distribution of (bio)medical
data to separate servers alleviates some privacy-related risks
in the sense that linking e.g., clinical health records, images
and genomes of patients for computations is then much
more difficult for intruders. There are also formal models
for fragmentation such as constraint-based fragmentation [19]:
constraints specify which attributes should be physically sep-
arated, and the corresponding heuristics return a minimal
number of fragments that satisfy the constraints; in practice,
this determines the number of non-communicating servers
needed to securely deploy the fragmented database. This type
of fragmentation has also been integrated into a framework
for secure distributed biomedical analyses [10].
B. Developing distributed medical analyses
Secure distributed biomedical analyses is a relatively recent
research domain that is centered around the execution of
analyses on cluster or high-performance calculator infrastruc-
tures. Existing frameworks therefore do not involve advanced
features for distributed analyses that we advocate in this paper,
such as architecture-driven placement and scalability as well
as advanced security and privacy mechanisms. Using current
tools that typically support features like sequential workflows
and the parallel execution of analyses on cluster infrastructures
using, for example, Apache Spark.
Secure biomedical analysis engineering today calls for spe-
cific workflow management tools aware of the locations of
data and computation, privacy levels, scalability properties
of different infrastructures in order to conduct distributed
collaboration studies. For illustration purposes, consider an
analysis workflow running data from Fig. 2 architecture,
suppose that the steps are the following: 1) neuroimaging
data is analyzed in order to select interesting patients, 2)
genomes of the selected patients are sequenced and analyzed,
3) the relevant genomes will be contributed to an international
association study cohort for deeper discovery. Unfortunately,
to this date, there is no real-life workflow management tool
that will manage the corresponding distributed deployment and
execution properties, notably security and privacy issues, for
instance, when data is transferred to the international realm at
step 3.
C. I-CAN revisited
Figure 4 shows two extensions of the distributed computing
infrastructure supporting the I-CAN multi-centric study. These
extensions are aimed at better supporting the scalability of the
massive and heterogeneous data analyses (C1), enhancing the
computational reproducibility (C2), as well as better preserv-
ing security and privacy (C3) in the context of sensitive human
data.
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Fig. 4. Safe public clouds and trusted community clouds provide means to
address reproducibility, privacy and scalability in the context of the intracranial
aneurysm multi-center studies.
Among the state-of-the-art architectures summarized in
Fig. 3 we argue that a combination of multiple community
cloud infrastructures (Fig. 3 (d)) and secured public cloud
infrastructures (Fig. 3 (c)) are the cornerstone to develop large-
scale multi-center research studies.
For instance, the medical image processing could be scaled-
up thanks to a dedicated computing infrastructure equipped
with GPUs (red cloud entitled “Trusted community cloud
(GPU)”). The scalability of the whole data processing could
also be enhanced if multiple cloud infrastructures can be
mobilized to the nearest data sources. This would prevent data
relocation in a single cloud infrastructure which can cause
network bandwidth, storage or compute bottlenecks and thus
provide means to address challenge C1.
In addition, relocating sensitive human data outside data
production sites can raise legal or ethical issues. However,
it is generally required when participating in an interna-
tional collaboration. In this context, we advocate the use
of public cloud infrastructures (blue cloud in Fig. 4) for
the GWAS part, provided that data is protected beforehand
using fully homomorphic encryption or combining partially
homomorphic encryption with secure hardware component
enabled at the public cloud server, both strategies allow full
(privacy-preserving) processing in public cloud infrastructures
(Fig. 3(c)). More precisely, an international GWAS can be used
in a public cloud infrastructures in the following steps:
1) Each data owner computes locally the contingency tables
for each SNP
2) Each data owner encrypts the tables with a homomorphic
encryption scheme using the same encryption key
3) Each data owner sends the encrypted tables to the public
cloud infrastructure
4) The public cloud adds the tables values together to get
the final contingency table (of each SNP) corresponding
to data from all participants
5) at this level, there are two possibilities:
• Whether the statistical test is performed on the
encrypted final contingency table, but this requires
use of a fully homomorphic scheme at step 2.
Otherwise,
• The homomorphic scheme can be additive only, in
which case, we require the public cloud to enable se-
cure hardware based computations e.g., sgx-enabled
cloud, that will decrypt the table to calculate the
statistical test and encrypts the obtained results
6) Encrypted results are communicated to researchers
Finally, by nature, both public and community cloud infras-
tructures leverage virtualization technologies and thus provide
a key building block for more reproducible scientific computa-
tions (challenge C2). Here, the collaborating partners agree on
a precisely-defined software environment. These environments
are then stored into a virtual machine responsible for the
execution of the whole data analysis. Thanks to this virtual
machine, the whole data analysis can be re-executed on a
local computer or on any community cloud infrastructure thus
enhancing the reproducibility of the analysis.
Summarizing this section, we think distributed biomedical
analyses have to be supported by specialized tooling that
supports architecture-based placement and scalability as well
as largely automatic handling of security and privacy issues,
in particular, at the level of biomedical workflows.
V. RELATED WORK
The biomedical scientific community creates knowledge
through collaborative and distributed workflows. We call a
scientific workflow distributed and collaborative when it links
together computational tasks and datasets located in several
geographically separated sites. In this section, we explore
approaches that address the problems found when processing
these distributed and collaborative workflows. Concretely, we
present related work comparing it with the categories discussed
earlier in this paper: data and computation placement, data
security and privacy, scalability and performance. At the end
of the section, we also consider how these studies compare
with our proposal.
A. Placement of computations and data
As seen before, when realizing collaborative and distributed
workflows several constraints arise (e.g., legal or technical)
restricting data movement and computation placement. In this
section, we present studies addressing the problem of data and
computation placement in these workflows. The problem of
data placement is a prominent problem to solve in scientific
workflow systems [20]. It is a big challenge in biomedical
analysis, making it necessary to minimize data transfer among
distributed data centers. In many cases, to perform such
optimization, it is required to know the data dependency,
the bandwidth limit, and the storage capacity on each data
center. However, finding the optimal placement of a dataset in
a distributed system is an NP-hard problem [21], and then,
several strategies have been proposed to find approximate
solutions. Yuan et al. [22] propose an approach based on
k-means clustering, guaranteeing a balanced distribution of
data, even for the amount of data, using a data placement
matrix. This matrix is created using the information of the data
centers (size and storage capacity). Similarly, Zhao et al. [21]
implement a data placement based using genetic algorithms
using a similar matrix.
In contrast, several proposals have addressed the problem of
optimal computation placement under a given set of constrains
[23]–[26]. As expected, these studies have shown that moving
the computation near the data is much “cheaper” than moving
the data to the computation.
B. Data security and privacy
Security and privacy must be granted during extraction,
transfer, and processing of data in collaborative and distributed
workflows. Addressing these requirements is challenging, es-
pecially considering the amount of biomedical data involved,
the inherent insecurity and heterogeneity of the network, the
lack of strong information security policies on the organiza-
tions, and the technical complexity of information security
solutions (see for example the discussion on [27]).
There are different approaches to minimize these risks. Ken
et al. [28] propose an analysis technique capable of processing
ciphered data located on third-party servers, without accessing
the actual data, reducing then, the risk of unauthorized access
or a data leak [29]. Similarly, Vinod et al. [30] propose a ho-
momorphic method of probabilistic encryption, supported on
the additive and multiplicative properties of homomorphisms
and the Euler’s theorem, to process data without looking at it.
Other approaches have investigated security strategies for
storage, transfer, and sharing of biomedical data. These ap-
proaches concentrate on preserving the integrity, preserving
confidentiality, and respecting data ownership. For example,
GIFT-Cloud [31] is a collaborative platform sharing biomedi-
cal data and images, that is supported on an advanced technical
architecture. In the platform, all data transferred to the server
is encrypted and passed through a chain of gateways and
firewalls guaranteeing the protection against intruders. Simi-
larly, XNAT 3 adapts to the special needs of highly controlled
data exchange and provides different levels of protection for
private, protected and public information. These collaborative
platforms have been subject of several studies addressing
compliance with biomedical information security policies, for
example, iDASH [32] is a collaborative platform compatible
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) 4.
Finally, other studies propose an integrated solution where
security is considered at the workflow definition. In [33], [34],
authors propose techniques to enforce security constraint on
workflow definitions. Similarly, Chebotko et al. [35] propose
three levels of security specification within workflows: at task
level, at port level, and at data channel level.
C. Scalability and performance
Several approaches addressing scalability and performance
have been proposed. In this section, we discuss three cate-
gories of studies: studies based on the optimal distribution
of computation on a cluster located in one site; approaches
combining workflow support with distributed computation;
and standalone approaches.
Hadoop5 is a framework for distributed and parallel data
processing and analysis of large amounts of data. Hadoop, was
originally based on the MapReduce heuristic but currently, it
can be used to implement any kind of distributed algorithm.
GATK (Genome Analysis Toolkit) [36] was the first bioin-
formatics applications implemented using MapReduce and is
widely used in genomic data analysis. Crossbow [37] supports
different processing models including Hadoop cluster, a single
computer, or Amazon EMR (Elastic Map Reduce). Similarly,
MetaSpark, Halvade, CloudBurst, DistMap, SeqWare, and
Hydra process the data using Hadoop or Spark6 [6]. MapRe-
duce and Hadoop have been widely used in Next Generation
Sequencing (NGS) problems due to the way they parallelize
and distribute the data [8]. However, many bioinformatic
problems cannot be solved using those tools because they
require advanced computer skills to design efficient solutions.
To help researchers to design efficient experiments on the
tools described above, several studies investigate the use of
distributed workflow languages or environments to define
distributed scientific workflows. Galaxy, Taverna, and Wings
[38], [39] are Data Workflow Systems (DWFSs). Galaxy is
3https://www.xnat.org
4https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK500019/
5https://hadoop.apache.org/
6https://spark.apache.org/
very popular in the bioinformatics community and allows large
scale data analysis from different formats [40], and is designed
under the model PaaS. In contrast, Taverna was conceived
under the model SaaS. It has been widely used in several
fields such as bioinformatics, biodiversity, social sciences, and
astronomy [38], [40]. Finally, Wings has been used in different
domains, such as sciences, text analytics, geosciences, and
multi-omics analysis (see Malcolm et al. [40] for a more
detailed discussion on workflows system).
Finally, there are still many standalone applications that
perform data analysis in single computers. VaRank has been
used locally in the identification of genes in some diseases.
Similarly, KD3 and S-MART allow extracting knowledge
from biological data locally, and CAFE allows alignment-free
genome and metagenome comparisons [41]–[44].
Based on the above and according to [38], most of the
current DWFSs are not efficient, nor are they lightweight, nor
contribute to large-scale data analysis in an efficient way. For
this reason, great challenges are identified in the design of
workflow systems that cover the three categories discussed in
this section.
D. Discussion
Table II compares the tools discussed above against the
architectural features proposed for a distributed and collab-
orative framework for biomedical analyses (see Sec. IV),
which are: Data and computation placement; Security and
confidentiality; and scalability and performance. Each feature,
is further divided in sub-categories, this allows us to have
more detailed analysis. The ’X’ indicates that the property is
satisfied in some proportion, and the blanks indicate otherwise.
In the table, applications designed for local computations
and local data placement, were considered more likely to have
stronger security policies and easier implementation of those
policies. So they were marked as having very secure features in
storage, data transfer, and processing. In contrast, tools with
distributed data or computation placement, were marked as
secure only when it was stated explicitly in the literature.
Many applications grant fragmentation and distribution of
data in a cloud infrastructure (e.g., Map Reduce services on
Amazon Web Services), but they do not necessarily ensure the
placement of data in different locations. In these systems, the
security and privacy risk with the data increases, since there
is an intervention of third parties, while the scalability and
performance of the data improve significantly because such
systems are designed to scale dynamically.
It is important to note, that very few tools provide a mech-
anism for describing distributed workflows, thus the challenge
of reproducibility is a very hard constrain for biomedical
researchers. Reproducibility, in the current state of the art
depends on the skills and expeerience of reasearchers and not
on the availability of strong and standard workflow languages.
In summary, this classification allows us to verify that
there are not collaborative frameworks, supporting scientific
workflow description, and satisfying all the architectural fea-
tures discussed in this work. This is a great challenge and
an opportunity for research and implementation of optimal
collaborative frameworks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have motivated that multi-party studies
involving biomedical analyses often benefit from distributed
collaborations. They are, however, subject to difficult chal-
lenges concerning the computation and placement of data and
computations, scalability and reproducibility of computations,
as well as the security and privacy, notably of sensitive data.
We have introduced a set of nine architectures for such
distributed analyses and sketched a development method that
starts by selecting an architecture in order to determine the
placement and scalability strategies, develop an appropriate
security and privacy enforcement strategy before implementing
the analysis itself. We have also illustrated the challenges and
solutions we propose in the context of a real-world multi-
stakeholders biomedical study, the I-CAN project.
As future work, we plan to extend an existing frame-
work [10] in order to provide full-fledged support for the secu-
rity and privacy challenge of distributed biomedical analysis.
Furthermore, we plan to extend tools that are used by biomed-
ical researchers to implement a comprehensive development
method for distributed analyses.
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